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When the first ten amendments were proclaimed on Dec. 15, 
1791, James Madison, the brilliant Virginian who was more than 
any other person responsible for drafting them, securing their 
adoption in Congress, and obtaining their ratification by the 
states, had fulfilled the federalist promise to satisfy those who 
opposed the Constitution because it had no bill of rights. James 
Madison,.no doubt would be astonished, were he alive today, to 
discover that now there· are people who think the First Amendment 
and the Sixth Amendment are in contradiction. That argument did 
not appear (so far as I can discover) in the debates in the first 
Congress, in the fight for ratification, or anywhere else in the 
country. 
It is astonishing that this "conflict", now widely perceived, 
did not occur to anyone in 1791. 
The Anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitution did not say 
anything I can discover about th~ failure of the Constitution to 
afford protection of a fair trial, but they were eloquent about 
the protection fQr a free press. George Mason thought Congress: 
"would oppress the people; and if anyone dared ·to defend them could 
not Congress, pretending to act for the general welfare, construe 
their action as sedition?" He worried that Congress could "restrict 
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the press, and try cases arising from that restriction within its 
own ten-mile jurisdiction" •. (P 125, The Anti-Federalists, Jackson 
Turner Main) 
Silas Lee suggested Congress might silence criticism of an 
administration. (P 154, The Anti-Federalists) 
The New York Journal thought that: "if preachers and printers 
are troublesome to the new government, and that in the opinion of 
its rulers, it shall be for the general welfare to restrain or 
suppress both the one and the other, it may be done consistently 
with the new Constitution". (P 200, The Anti-Federalists) Others 
voiced the same anxiety that the federal government might prosecute 
citizens for utterance in.the federal courts. 
Anxiety about the Sixth Amendment rights seemed·nowhere near 
as important to the Anti-Federalist critics. 
Chief Justice Burger said on July 2, 1980, in Richmond Newspapers 
v Commonwealth of Virginia, "here for the first time the Court is 
asked to decide whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to 
the public on the unopposed request of a defendant, without any 
demonstration that closure is required to protect the defendants 
superior right to a fair trial, or that some other over-riding 
consideration requires closure". 
In his opinion, which in the future·, in my view, Will take its 
place alongside Near v ~innesota, as a fundamental statement of 
American constitutional doctrine, Burger went back beyond Madison 
and the Constitutional Convention and the Bill of Rights, to cite 
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the origins of our modern theories on the criminal trial. He then 
made the assertion that: "What is significant for present purposes 
is that throughout its evolution, the trial has been open to all 
who cared to observe"·· 
From the earliest times, and through all changes in the law, 
he pointed out, "one thing remained constant: the public character 
of the trial at which guilt or innocence was· decided". 
He quoted Sir Thomas Smith who wrote in 1565 that beyond the 
indictment "all the rest is done openlie in the presence of the 
Judges, the Justices, the enquest, the prisoner, and so manie as 
will or can come so neare as to heare it, and all depositions and 
witnesses given aloude, that all men may heare from the mouth of 
the depositors and witnesses what is saide". 
The Chief Justice concluded that the court had "found nothing 
to suggest that the presumptive openness of the trial was not also 
an attribute of the judicial systems of colonial America"o He 
cited the colonial practise in Virginia and adverted to the 1677 
Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, which provided that: 
"In all publick courts of justice for tryals of causes, civil or 
criminal, any person or persons, inhabitants of the said Province, 
may freely come into and attend the said courts, and hear and be 
present, at all or any such tryals as shall be there hatl or passed, 
that justice may not be done in a corner nor in a covert manner". 
The Chief Justice also cited the Pennsylvania Frame of 
Government of 1682 which provided that "all courts shall be open" 
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and noted its reafirmation in section 26 of the Constitution 
adopted by Pennsylvania in 1776. 
He might also have noted that architectural monument to the 
doctrine of the open court - the court room in Independence Hall 
in Philadelphia. When you enter that building, the old Pennsylvania 
State House built in 1735, you proceed on a central corridor, to 
the left of which is the chamber where the Constitutional 
Convention met, and to the right of which, separated only by open 
marble arches, and with no door at all, is the court room where 
the Pennsylvania. court convened. 
In summary the Chief Justice noted that, "at the time when 
our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in 
England had long been presumptively open". He added that, "in 
guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First 
Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend 
trials so as.to give meaning to those explicit guarantees-". He 
then cited First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti, which said: 
"the first Amendment goes beyond protection of the press •••• to 
prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from 
which members of the public may draw." 
He also cited Kleindienst v Mandel, which held that there is 
a "first amendment right to receive information and ideas". 
He quoted from Branzburg·v Haves which said that "without 
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press 
could be eviscerated,,. 
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Chief Justice Burger met head on the State's assertion that 
the Constitution does not spell out a guarantee for the right of 
the public to attend trials •. He noted that the u.s. Supreme Court 
had acknowledged that "certain unarti~ulated rights are implicit 
in the enumerated guarantees". 
The.Chief Justice said: "We hold that the right to attend 
criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First 
Amendment, without the freedom to attend such trials, which people 
have exercised for centur_ies, important aspects of freedom of 
speech and of the press c·ould be eviscerated". 
And finally, the Chief Justice said: "Absent an over-riding 
interest· articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must 
be open to the public". 
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, said: "This is 
a watershed case. Until today the Court has accorded virtually 
absolute protection to the dissemination.of information or ideas, 
but·never before has it squarely held that the acquisition of 
newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protection 
whatsoever". 
At another point, he said: "Today, however, for the first 
time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference 
with access to important information is ·an abridgement"of the 
freedom of speech and of the press protected .by the First Amendment". 
Justice Blackman's concurring opinion was especially 
interesting in that he hailed the Court's reliance upon legal 
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history in determining the fundamental public character of the· 
criminal trial. At the same time he regretted the Court's ruling 
in Gannett which he said apparently was to the effect that there 
is no Sixth Amendment·right on the part of the public or the 
press to an open hearing on a motion to suppress. He held that 
in error and said he remained convinced that the right to a public 
trial is to be found where the Constitution explicitly placed 
it in the Sixth Amendment". 
Gannett v DePasguale, of course, still stands. There the 
Court upheld the closure of pre-trial proceedings upon agreement 
of prosecution and defense to a closed pr~ceeding. ..The dis·senting · 
justices in that decision made many of the arguments against 
cl9sure that were made by the majority in Richmond Newspapers v 
Virginia. And there is some language in the Burger opinion that 
gives it a narrow application. It refers to the issue as being 
"whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon 
the unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration 
that closure is required to protect the defendant's superior right 
to ·a fair trial, or that some other overriding consideration 
requires closure". It leaves open, to be sure, for future debate 
what happens if closure is sought to protect the defendant's right 
or for "some other overriding consideration". 
The decisive closing sentence is "absent an overriding interest 
articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open 
to the public". 
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We may hear more about these exceptions in the Boston Globe 
case and the Washington Post case now before the United States 
Supreme Court. 
Nevertheless, an overwhelming, almost unassailable argument 
has been made for the general philosophy and the basic assumption 
tbat trials must by openly conducted. It is hardly possible to 
reconcile with ·this sweeping generalization in favor of open trials 
any narrow contention for closed court proceedings. Ultimately~ 
it seems likely that DePasguale will be brought more in line with 
this opinion. As long as 85 percent of all criminal proceedings 
are disposed of in pre-trial proceedings, the principles of 
Richmond Newspapers v Virginia, must prevail if criminal justice 
is to be ad.ministered with the open-ness that the Supreme Court 
has def ended in this historic opinion. 
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